Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

Problems inherent in the traditional Doctrine of the Incarnation

Why Christological reformulation is an essential task: a case study in the construction of metaphysical conundrums

It may be thought by some that the mere idea of formulating a 'Christology for today' is at best misconceived or unnecessary, at worst blasphemous. After all, 'The Truth' (God's truth) was pronounced at Chalcedon, wasn't it? Jesus Christ was and is both God and Man, in a hypostatic union of two natures - what more is there to say? This rather complacent tendency (complacent in the sense that no attempt is made to question these past formulations as they are) may be illustrated by the October 2014 'Agreed Statement on Christology' made between the Anglican Communion and the Oriental Orthodox (one of the 'Non-Chalcedonian') Churches. Back in the mid-5 Century a schism arose between those Churches which supported Chalcedon's two-nature Christology and those who continued to embrace (because it seems to have been the prior 'default' position) a one-nature (either a more nuanced 'miaphysitism' or rather less so 'monophysitism': Gk: physis/phusis – 'nature') understanding of Christ.

In his brief introduction to this Agreement, Bishop Geoffrey Rowell (Anglican Co-Chairman) points to a range of "ecumenical encounters and dialogues of the last half-century or so ... [during which] there have been notable efforts to resolve this ancient division". This particular Agreement is the "latest" and has been built "on earlier theological agreements". In this latest Agreed Statement we read that despite the prior classic disagreement, these churches now,

"... following the teaching of our common father Saint Cyril of Alexandria ... can confess together that in the one incarnate nature of the Word of God, two different natures, distinguished in thought alone ... continue to exist without separation, without division, without change, and without confusion" (echoing many of the phrases of the Athanasian Creed).

Bishop Rowell (rightly, I am sure) celebrates this ecumenical agreement which appears to offer a compromise position or, rather, a position which enables two previous, apparently contradictory, views to be reconciled: although, as we shall see, when seeking to differentiate between mono- and mia-physitism the issue is not quite so straightforward. It is not the case (and according to the Agreement never, apart from the Eutychian heresy, had been the case) of believing that there was either one nature in Christ or two, but rather that there is "one incarnate nature of the Word of God" in which there are "two different natures, distinguished in thought alone [which] continue to exist without separation ...": in essence, and using Cyril's terminology, 'one out of two' (eis ek duo). If this is a correct analysis, then one might reasonably ask what the 5 Century 'schism' (which included the Miaphysite Oriental Orthodox as well as the more extreme Monophysites) was all about. Furthermore, one still might even more reasonably ask: 'what, precisely, were they talking about?' Those who drew up this Agreement speak as though they have a precise and uncluttered understanding of both a divine nature and a human nature, and also of the (apparently distinct) "one incarnate nature of the Word", without ever considering the philosophical difficulties of positing the union of two very different (so one assumes from the other language used) and possibly entirely contradictory concepts.

Indeed, the fundamental problem is that the language and concepts of the 5 Century are treated as a priori 'givens', acceptance of which bypasses the need to question either the assertions themselves or the way in which they have been expressed. Whatever it may mean to say so (and meaning doesn't seem to have bothered the authors of this Agreement, just as it didn't over-bother their forebears: they all seem to believe that they are dealing with fully comprehensible concepts), Jesus Christ was ontologically one (homoousios) with God and a person who possessed two (or is it just the one, or some combination in which 'two' is actually one?) natures. The argument (if one may call it that) put forward in the Agreement, when based on this quite uncritical acceptance of the Councils ('because the Church Fathers said this, it must be correct'), might sound superficially logical, even though it draws unanimity out of a previous set of contrary positions (one nature or two or ...?) which were, in the 5 Century, taken so seriously as to create a formal schism between churches.

In the Agreement, the hypostatic union is recognised as a "mystery" (in which case, how can we speak of it at all?) in which

"... those among us who speak of two natures in Christ are justified in doing so since they do not thereby deny their inseparable indivisible union; similarly, those among us who speak of one incarnate nature of the Word are justified in doing so since they do not thereby deny the continuing dynamic presence in Christ of the divine and the human, without change, without confusion".

To give proper credit in a situation where they appear to be cleverly reconciling two positions which had been previously thought irreconcilable (or were they: perhaps the 'Miaphysites' have been orthodox all along?), the writers point out that they

"... recognise the limit of all theological language and the philosophical terminology of which it makes and has made use ... [adding] We are unable to net and confine the mystery of God's utter self-giving in the incarnation of the divine Word in an ineffable, inexpressible and mysterious union of divinity and humanity, which we worship and adore".

Such theological modesty is to be commended: as we shall see, the 'apophatic horizons' of any doctrine should be respected.

Nevertheless, particularly in an age where theology forms part (or should form part) of critical scholarship: being prepared to follow the evidence wherever it leads and not being constrained by prior positions, there is something just a little disconcerting in reading that Jesus Christ is 'this-and-that', particularly when, because it is a divine mystery, we do not really know what 'this-and-that' actually means. Would it not have been better to enquire into what the classic doctrines were seeking to express in the language and concepts they used at the time (aims and intentions), and then consider whether other language and concepts (methodology) might be more meaningful today, rather than just parroting the past? After all, this Agreement was reached in 2014.

To briefly summarise a somewhat confusing 5 Century debate, confusing, not least to the modern mind, because the Greek words used: 'mia' and 'monos', appear to be synonymous, meaning 'one', 'single', 'only'; however, 'mia' can mean also mean 'united' and so could imply a more cautious or conservative form of 'mono ...': that the natures were truly and equally united into one without one or the other predominating:

1. Jesus Christ was thought (somehow) to be both human and divine and the classic Christological heresies were those positions which went too far in one direction or the other (too divine or even too human);

2. Chalcedonian orthodoxy was 'dyophysite': Christ was said to be 'made up' of two distinct natures, human and divine, brought together in a personal ('hypostatic') union of the Divine Word with the man Jesus of Nazareth;

3. 'miaphysites' understood humanity and divinity to be united in Christ in one nature, but in such a way as to be 'without separation, confusion or alteration';

4. this Christological position arose as a response to (Antiochene) Nestorianism (although scholars today wonder whether alleged heretic Nestorius was ever himself 'Nestorian') which made such a distinction between the human and divine natures that it might seem that two separate people 'lived' in the one Jesus Christ; Nestorianism was condemned at the Council of Ephesus in 431;

5. whilst some Chalcedonians thought that a 'miaphysite' position could be interpreted in an orthodox manner, others saw it as a form of the subtlely different 'monophysitism'; equally, some 'miaphysites' condemned Chalcedon as being just another version of Nestorianism; they wanted to stick rigidly to Cyril's formula: "one nature of the Word of God Incarnate";

6. the equal and opposite heresy to Nestorianism was that of Eutyches (together with the earlier and equally docetic Apollinarianism) who taught that the divine and human were so tightly united that Christ's humanity was absorbed into his divinity (like 'a drop of vinegar in the ocean'); this was anathematised at Chalcedon in 451 and, as we have seen, equally rejected in the recent Agreement as being at all representative of miaphysitism;

7. true 'monophysites' were those who believed that, after the Incarnation, Christ possessed only a single nature, either (predominantly) divine, or some synthesis of divine-human, but one in which – in true docetic fashion – the divine would always predominate;

8. historically, 'Monophysitism' refers primarily to the position of those (especially in Egypt and to a lesser extent Syria) who rejected the Council of Chalcedon; themoderate members of this group, however, maintained a 'Miaphysite' Christology that was adopted by the Oriental Orthodox Churches; as we have seen in Point 7 of the recent Agreement, the Oriental Orthodox reject the label 'Monophysite' even as a generic term, although it is to be found extensively in the historical literature;

9. after Chalcedon, the Monophysite controversy (together, as ever, with many other factors) led to a lasting schism between the Oriental Orthodox Churches on the one hand, and the Western and the Eastern Orthodox Churches on the other; the Christological conflict between monophysitism, dyophysitism, and their various subtle combinations and derivatives, lasted from the third through to the eighth centuries and left its mark on all but the first two great Ecumenical Councils.

In the light of modern historical research and ecumenical discussions, the Miaphysite and Chalcedonian positions appear to differ mainly in their understanding of the key term 'nature' (physis) rather than in their basic Christologies (thus making agreement more possible); but other smaller differences of interpretation or emphasis also existed. When we explore the original disagreements we find that, in the two great theological 'schools' of ancient Christianity, Alexandrian thought was supportive of a 'One Nature Christology' which sought to explain how the Eternal Word (Logos) became incarnate as a man, whilst the Antiochenes tended towards a 'Two Nature Christology' (beginning with the humanity of Christ and then seeking to explain how the Jesus of the Gospels was united with the Word: an idea which had reached its expressive apogee in John 1) as represented by such as Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, for whom Christ's humanity and divinity were united in a single prosopon ('person'). Here the union was seen to be like that of body and soul – or even man and wife: although united, the two separate 'elements' always remained recognisable, with the presence of the Logos in Christ being similar to the presence of God's grace in a person.

As with all the ancient debates about Christology and Trinitarian theology there were tremendous problems posed by language: its use and meaning, not to mention translations between Greek and Latin. For Cyril of Alexandria 'physis' represented a concrete reality; so the ascription of two natures potentially gave two separate persons (sometimes unhappily described as a 'panto-horse' Jesus). This was further complicated by the fact that, for Cyril, physis was almost, if not quite, the equivalent of hypostasis (the word which came to be used for 'person'), and not, as later, 'nature'. This meant that later monophysites (true 'one-nature' believers) could, and did, claim Cyril's authority for their position. However, for the Antiochenes 'nature' was somewhat less concrete, so that two natures could unite in an external reality. For example, Nestorius was understood to be saying that Christ was two persons, one human the other divine, with no real union, just a 'mechanical' conjunction, so Christ was both 'Son of God' who was omniscient and 'Son of Man' who suffered and wept: a representation which also resulted in Jesus having two wills or minds, because their philosophy tied those to a 'nature' rather than to a 'person'. As, from our position in the 21 Century, we consider these esoteric debates about the nature of Jesus Christ, we might be wondering exactly what was going on – and why.

As we shall shortly consider in more detail, we must also reckon with the influence of Hellenistic philosophy on theological development:

"... in his effort to make philosophical sense of the Incarnation Cyril employed categories whose home is Plotinus and Apollinarius. The Plotinian picture of human nature is of a being that has, as it were, his head in heaven and his feet on earth. On the one hand he is an intellectual perfect spirit, and on the other he has emotions and feelings and a body. How can both be fitted together into a single person? This problem is addressed in Enneads 3: 6 entitled 'The impassivity of the unembodied'. For Plotinus the immateriality of the soul excludes any influence upon it of bodily or emotional states. His conclusion is stated clearly, 'that the Intellectual Essence, wholly of the order of Ideal Form, must be taken as impassive has already been established' [so] even the human soul is not entirely immersed in the body ... In other words there is always part of every human being that rises above the emotions of the lower soul and the body. The presence of the impassible spirit in the body/soul is not proof of its having lost its impassibility. Cyril's knowledge of Hellenistic literature was considerable and ... he may have read Plotinus ... After all there was a flourishing Neoplatonic academy in Alexandria ... His language ... rather suggests some acquaintance with the Enneads as he offers a similar solution to the same problem as faced Plotinus. The presence of the impassible Word in a human being composed of body and soul to form one person need not threaten the divine immutability and freedom from passion and sin".

It is arguable that Cyril's reaction to Nestorius went so far in the opposite theological direction as to completely undermine Christ's humanity and thus blur the distinction between Father and Son:

"Cyril's Christ remained an abstraction, his humanity so much part of the divine world as to be unrecognizable in human terms ... There was no Biblical ring in his thought ...".

As I have already argued: that would generally appear to be the case with 'orthodox' Christology – however it is expressed, Christ's humanity is inevitably compromised.

"The problem in all this was that Cyril was drawing much more heavily than he realised on extreme One Nature doctrines ... In forming his ideas, he was entranced by a phrase that he believed had been written by ... Athanasius, who had supposedly spoken of Christ as 'one Nature (mia phusis) of the Logos of God Incarnate'. Through Cyril, this idea became the basis of emerging Christian orthodoxy. The problem was that the text in question was forged, and the idea actually came not from Athanasius, but from Apollinarius ... Based on these spurious texts, the Alexandrian tradition became ever more committed to the ideas of One Nature".

For Cyril

"The Word, having united to himself hypostatically in an ineffable and inconceivable manner flesh animated by a rational soul, became man and was called son of man ... While the natures that were brought together in true union are different, yet from them both is the one Christ and Son ... the Godhead and the manhood, by their ineffable and indescribable coming together into unity, perfected for us the one Lord and Christ and Son."

Although he accepted that the Incarnation consisted of the joining of two natures (human and divine), Cyril asserted that once the Word had become 'enfleshed' in Jesus there was only one nature: the human and divine natures were continuous with each other and ran into one. So although Christ possessed two natures, God the Word was the only active subject. Cyril even went so far as to suggest that Christ 'suffered impassibly' (a semantic contradiction) on the cross. As

"... an exponent of the 'Word-flesh' scheme, [Cyril] thought rather in terms of two phases or stages in the existence of the Logos, one prior to and the other after the incarnation. The Logos, as he liked to say, 'remains what He was'; what happened was that at the incarnation, while continuing to exist eternally in the form of God, He added to that by taking the form of a servant. Both before and after the incarnation He was the same Person unchanged in His essential deity. The only difference was that He who had existed 'outside flesh' [asarkos] now became 'embodied' [ensomatos]. The nature or hypostasis which was the Word became enfleshed [sesarkomene]; henceforth the Word was 'incarnate'".

(Continues…)

---

Excerpted from "Questioning the Incarnation"
by .
Copyright © 2017 Peter Shepherd.
Excerpted by permission of John Hunt Publishing Ltd..
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

---